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THE DAWN OF SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE (SOCINT) 
Laura K. Donohue* 
ABSTRACT 
 More information about citizens’ lives is recorded than ever before. Because 
the data is digitized, it can be accessed, analyzed, shared, and combined with other 
information to generate new knowledge. In a post-9/11 environment, the legal 
standards impeding access to such data have fallen. Simultaneously, the advent of 
global communications and cloud computing, along with network convergence, have 
expanded the scope of information available. The U.S. government has begun to 
collect and to analyze the associated data.  
 The result is the emergence of what can be termed “social intelligence” 
(SOCINT), which this Article defines as the collection of digital data about social 
relationships. What distinguishes this type of information from more traditional 
forms of intelligence is that it draws from novel, digitized sources, such as metadata, 
social media, and geolocational information, to construct a detailed picture of 
networks—which themselves then serve as starting points for further analysis. The 
telephony metadata program initiated under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
provides one prominent example. Numerous other initiatives are underway. These 
collection programs carry significant risks. The construction of ZunZuneo 
demonstrates how SOCINT can be used not just to understand social dynamics, but 
to drive political, economic, or social change. As a constitutional matter, the broad 
collection of social data is at cross-purposes with the Fourth Amendment, with 
sobering consequences for individual rights. SOCINT thus ought to be treated as a 
form of collection in its own right, subject to unique restrictions, and not as a 
concomitant of other collection techniques. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology is altering the amount and type of information that can be 
known about citizens, with profound implications for privacy. A vast quantity of 
personal data is now digitized. Peoples’ lives are recorded by businesses; 
employers; local, state, and federal agencies; friends and family; and themselves. 
Cameras owned by private and public entities capture their movement in public 
space. Where they go, what they buy, what they read, with whom they interact, 
and the nature of their relationships with others are reflected in the digital sphere. 
The recording of this information means three things. First, it can be 
accessed. This is not a trivial consideration. Information that was not available 
now is, and it exists in quantities that dwarf what previously could have been 
known.1 Second, it can be analyzed at a level never before conceived.2 Advances 
in mathematics and network design mean that sophisticated algorithms can be 
applied to the information to generate new knowledge. In the process, those with 
access to the data can learn things that people do not even know about 
themselves. Third, and relatedly, because private information exists in a digital 
sphere, other information can be combined to deepen the understanding of the 
recorded data. Paralleling these changes, resource limitations that silently played 
a restraining role are just as quietly slipping away. 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010) 
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 (“Wal-Mart, a retail giant, handles more than 1 
million customer transactions every hour, feeding databases estimated at more than 2.5 
petabytes—the equivalent of 167 times the books in America’s Library of Congress . . . .”); 
The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of 
Things: Executive Summary, IDC (Apr. 2014), http://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-
universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm (stating the staggering amount of digital data has 
reached new thresholds and noting the amount of data is doubling in size every two years). 
 2.  See, e.g., Luca Cagliero & Alessandro Fiori, Knowledge Discovery from Online 
Communities, in SOCIAL NETWORKING AND COMMUNITY BEHAVIOR MODELING: QUALITATIVE 
AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES 123, 124 (Maytham Safar & Khaled A. Mahdi eds., 2012). 
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One of the most profound types of insight that can be generated from the 
digital world relates to social networks: connections between individuals and 
organizations that shed light on the social fabric, creating an object that can be 
observed, analyzed, and potentially, manipulated.3 The structure can be gleaned 
from electronic communications that range from telephones to computer-based 
interactions, such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), email, chat rooms, and 
gaming networks.4 Social media sites such as Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram, 
provide insight into connectedness between individuals, adding content that 
reveals beliefs, interests, and predilections—as well as what individuals have 
done and would like to do.5 Even traditional modes of communications, such as 
letters sent through the ordinary post, are not immune—the government records 
and digitizes envelope information. 6  Employment data, housing information, 
political contributions, religious observance, and participation in organizations 
that maintain a web presence offer further ways to document the extent and 
qualities of social, political, and economic communities.7 
The most salient question in analyzing social network data is not what can 
be studied, but where to draw the line.8 So much information is now available 
that one can construct a model of relationships within any conceivable 
community, filling out the picture with the nature of the interests that tie 
individuals together. Even relationships between regions or countries can be 
explored, in the process providing details on the nature and quality of the 
connections. The promise of “Big Data,” as it has come to be called, offers 
insight into the broadest, and the most minute, aspects of the social order.9 
 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  See, e.g., Joe Pappalardo, NSA Data Mining: How It Works, POPULAR MECHANICS 
(Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a9465/nsa-data-mining-how-it-
works-15910146/ (noting the NSA PRISM program collects information from “digital photos, 
stored data, file transfers, emails, chats, videos, and video conferencing”). 
 5.  See Cagliero & Fiori, supra note 2, at 124–25. 
 6.  See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law Enforcement, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-
mail.html?_r=o. 
 7.  See Mary Edwards, Community Guide to Development Impact Analysis, WISC.EDU, 
http://www.lic.wisc.edu/shapingdane/facilitation/all_resources/impacts/ana 
lysis_socio.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 8.  See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, When the Web’s Chaos Takes an Ugly Turn, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/technology/a-reddit-forum-prompts-
questions-of-where-to-draw-a-line.html. 
 9.  Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARV. MAG. (Apr. 2014), 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2014/03/why-big-data-is-a-big-deal. 
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Numerous sectors are keen to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by these new technologies.10 Industry is capitalizing on it, using the information 
generated to sell products and services that customers did not even realize they 
wanted. So when Amazon.com suggests, “other books you might like,” it turns 
out, you do.11  
Individuals are using it to connect to friends, and friends of friends, finding 
others with similar interests and creating worldwide communities. The social 
aspect of such networks offers connectedness. It offers opportunities to learn. It 
provides individuals with the chance to explore worlds that previously would not 
be accessible.  
The government, in turn, sees in Big Data opportunity for the more 
effective provision of services. 12  It looks to it as a way to conduct better 
investigations for law enforcement purposes. 13  And it seeks to realize the 
potential of not just detecting, but preventing future threats to national security.  
The foreign intelligence realm, in particular, has begun to shift its emphasis 
to Big Data as a way to identify and to respond to threats to national security. 
What is being created is a form of “social intelligence,” or SOCINT, which is 
broadly defined here as the collection of digital data about social relationships.14 
Notably, the U.S. intelligence community does not appear to separate digital 
social intelligence from other forms of information.15 Nor has Congress sought 
 
 10.  Boris Dzhingarov, Social Media: How Major Industries Take Advantage of the 
Emerging Content Platform, SOCIALNOMICS (June 24, 2015), http://www.social 
nomics.net/2015/06/24/social-media-how-major-industries-take-advantage-of-the-emerging-
content-platform/. 
 11.  See Thomas H. Davenport, Leandro Dalle Mule & John Lucker, Know What Your 
Customers Want Before They Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2011), http://hbr.org 
/2011/12/know-what-your-customers-want-before-they-do; Stephen Goldsmith, Big Data, 
Analytics and a New Era of Efficiency in Government, GOVERNING (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-big-data-analytics-government-efficiency.html. 
 12.  See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 11. 
 13.  See, e.g., Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big Data 
Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information Privacy, and Access 
to Government Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 398 (2014). 
 14.  SOCINT is used here as a potential intelligence moniker akin to HUMINT (human 
intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), or OSINT (open source intelligence). For a list of 
the various sources of intelligence collection, see Intelligence Collection Disciplines, FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/disciplines (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 15.  Instead, information that reveals social relationships is gleaned from other types of 
intelligence gathering, such as OSINT (open source intelligence), and SIGINT, which 
includes both COMINT (communications intelligence, i.e., information gleaned from 
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specifically to legislate in this area. To the contrary, the government has gone 
through legal gymnastics to read the authority to collect certain forms of 
SOCINT in a manner compatible with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.16 To the extent that SOCINT is not addressable through the current statutory 
regime, Executive Order 12333 and the associated directives remain the 
framing.17 
Changes in foreign intelligence collection, as well as global 
communications structures, have facilitated the extension of intelligence 
gathering to SOCINT. In the former area, since October 2001, there has been a 
weakening of the legal standards limiting access to citizens’ data.18 In the latter 
 
conversations between individuals), and ELINT (electronic intelligence, i.e., data obtained 
from electronic signals that are not themselves a direct part of communications). See 
Headquarters, Dep’t of US Army,  Open Source Intelligence, Army Techniques Publication 
No. 2-22.9 (July 10, 2012), available at https://fas.org/ 
irp/doddir/army/atp2-22-9.pdf; Intelligence Collection Disciplines, supra note 14 (defining 
SIGINT); RICHARD L. BERNARD, NSA, ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) AT NSA 1  
(2009), https://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/ 
misc/elint.pdf (defining ELINT); see also KERRY PATTON, SOCIOCULTURAL INTELLIGENCE: A 
NEW DISCIPLINE IN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES 11–12 (2010). But see David Omand, 
Understanding Digital Intelligence: A British View, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE ERA OF CYBER ESPIONAGE (Eugenie de Silva, ed., forthcoming 
January 2016) (distinguishing digital intelligence); David Omand, Jamie Bartlett, & Carl 
Miller, Introducing Social Media Intelligence,  27 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY 801, 
803–23 (2012) (distinguishing social media intelligence). 
 16.  See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 836–38 (2014) [hereinafter Donohue, 
Metadata Collection] (discussing redefinition of “relevant” to allow for the bulk collection of 
telephony metadata under FISA’s business records provision); see also CHARLIE SAVAGE, 
POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY 197, 201–201, 205–206 (2015) 
(discussing redefinition of “relevant,” “facility,” and “target” to allow for the broad collection 
of social data under separate sections of FISA). 
 17.  See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 18.  See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)); 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 
282 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2012)); EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
(FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015, at 1–2 (2011), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40138.pdf; see also generally LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE 
COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY (2008); Laura K. Donohue, 
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015) [hereinafter Donohue, International Content]; Donohue, 
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area, network convergence and the structure of global communications have 
further eroded barriers to collection. It used to be that foreign countries 
communicated with their agents over specialized network.19 Human intelligence 
reports, military dispatches, diplomatic instructions, and signals data were 
relayed through individualized routes.20 To intercept information, agents had to 
find a way to break into these systems.  
Foreign countries’ communications, however, are no longer restricted to 
separate networks.21 Instead, the same systems used daily by ordinary citizens 
carry foreign intelligence traffic.22 Simultaneously, the threat posed by non-state 
actors has increased.23 To locate and monitor these threats, the government has 
increasingly focused on systems carrying citizens’ private communications. 24 
Another aspect of network convergence expands the privacy interests implicated: 
it is not just one kind of communication carried via the Internet, but telephone, 
video, signals, and data all travel over its paths.25 As the so-called “Internet of 
Things” takes hold, the privacy interests will only deepen.26 
The structure of global communications themselves has also changed. 
Traditionally, domestic communications were provided with a higher level of 
protection than those carried internationally.27 But new technologies have broken 
down the distinction, with the result that a significant amount of domestic 
communications traverse U.S. borders, at which point they become subject to 
collection. 28  In the face of cloud computing, even static data, such as 
 
Metadata Collection, supra note 16. 
 19.  See, e.g., The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community—An Historical 
Overview, FAS (Feb. 23, 1996), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html (detailing a brief history 
of the development of the United States intelligence community and surveillance of foreign 
communications). 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  See RICHARD A. CLARKE, ET. AL, THE NSA REPORT: LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A 
CHANGING WORLD xi–xii (2014). 
 22.  See id. 
 23.  See id. at 27–30. 
 24.  See id. at xii. 
 25.  See Mark Elmore, Comment, Big Brother Where Art Thou, Electronic Surveillance 
and the Internet: Carving Away the Fourth Amendment Privacy Protections, 32 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1053, 1054-56 (2001). 
 26.  See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 132 (2014). 
 27.  See Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 766–67. 
 28.  See id. 
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photographs, papers, and financial records, may be held on servers overseas.29 
In brief, an increasing amount of information about individuals’ lives is 
digitized. It can be accessed, analyzed, and combined with other data to generate 
insight into society. 30  Simultaneously, changes in the foreign intelligence 
collection and global communications structures mean that the government now 
has broad access to this information.31  
This Article argues that the collection of digital social data, which can be 
combined with other information and queried to produce knowledge, and which 
is vulnerable to manipulation, represents a new form of intelligence. In the post-
9/11 world, the growth of SOCINT carries significant risks and has catapulted 
the country along a dangerous path. In taking this direction, the government is 
undermining bedrock principles on which the United States was founded. 
The Article begins by distinguishing SOCINT from other forms of 
intelligence gathering by positing three core characteristics: (a) the collection of 
non-traditional forms of digital data with deep implications for citizens’ privacy, 
(b) the function of SOCINT as a starting point for analysis of the social order, 
and (c) the potential use of the data to neutralize actors or to effect large-scale 
social, political, and economic change.32 
The Article next recognizes the absence of a sufficient statutory framing for 
the collection of this type of data, providing an example of how one recent 
program, the collection of telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).33 It 
then details some of the social intelligence programs currently being conducted 
under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, as well as Executive Order 
12333, highlighting in the process the depth of the privacy interests involved.34 
The Article then turns to the dangers of SOCINT.35 The nonstatic nature of 
 
 29.  See Axel Amback & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the 
Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic 
Abroad, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2015). 
 30.  Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does 
on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter Greenwald, XKeyscore], 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-on 
line-data/print. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  See infra Part II. 
 33.  See infra Part III. 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  See infra Part IV. 
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social networks and their vulnerability to manipulation increase the risks of 
allowing broad access to social network data.36 With little regard for political 
boundaries, instantaneous communication, and the potential leverage of massive 
human resources, social networks can be used to affect political, social, and 
economic change. The United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) effort to launch ZunZuneo in Cuba provides an example of how the 
U.S. government has tried to construct and use social networks for political 
aims.37  
From this, the Article highlights the constitutional concerns evinced in the 
course of social intelligence collection, noting that the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment was to eliminate general warrants.38 These instruments were used to 
collect information prior to any evidence of wrongdoing, with the attendant 
danger that the information—particularly information about relationships—could 
then be used to head off opposition. 39  The case of Paul Revere provides a 
powerful example of the strength of SOCINT and its potentially profound 
impact.40 The underlying rights questions also matter. The collection of social 
data may impact qualities otherwise protected by liberal democratic states, such 
as the importance of solitude and self-determination, the need to allow for 
democratic deliberation, and the attendant rights of freedom of speech and 
freedom of association.41  
The Article concludes by recognizing that whatever one may think about 
SOCINT, the fact that it is such a powerful tool—and one replete with underlying 
constitutional risks—means, at a minimum, that it deserves direct analysis and 
attention and not to be treated as a concomitant of other forms of intelligence 
gathering.42 What is needed is a stronger statutory framing, removing SOCINT 
from the sole domain of Executive Order 12333, or as an ancillary to FISA §702.  
II. DEFINING SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Social intelligence (SOCINT), the collection of digital data about social 
relationships, differs from other forms of intelligence gathering in three critical 
ways.  
 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  See infra Part V. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  See id. 
 41.  See id. 
 42.  See infra Part VI. 
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First, SOCINT relies on non-traditional, digitized data, which includes 
social media, communications metadata, and geolocational information. The first 
category further subdivides into at least three areas: social sites, collaborative 
platforms, and interest-group formation. 
Social media sites like Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram, and Snapchat, as 
well as dating sites like Match.com, eHarmony, and Lovestruck, are designed to 
create connections between people.43 These sites are a product of the digital 
revolution, and they have attracted an enormous amount of attention. Match.com 
started in 1995.44 By 2004, it had registered more than 42 million users.45 It now 
has approximately 24 million users at any one time.46 It is only one of myriad 
dating sites. According to the company, some forty million Americans regularly 
use online dating services.47 In January 2004, Facebook did not even exist.48 It 
formally became Facebook.com in August 2005. 49  Just one decade later, on 
August 27, 2015, one billion users signed onto the site.50 According to founder 
and CEO Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook maintains 1.5 billion monthly users.51  
Social media reaches beyond sites designed to create networks to include 
collaborative platforms—i.e., websites and apps that enable people to create and 
to share content.52 Sites that may not appear on their face as serving in a social 
 
 43.  See Social Media, MERRIAM-WESBSTER DICTIONARY,  http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Nov. 1, 2015) (defining social media as 
“forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) 
through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal 
messages, and other content (as videos)). 
 44.  See About Match.com, MATCH.COM, http://www.match.com/help/aboutus. 
aspx?lid=4 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 45.  It’s a Record Breaker; Guinness Says Match.com Leads the World in Online Dating, 
SOURCEWIRE NEWS DISTRIBUTION (Nov. 22, 2004), http://www.sourcewire.com 
/news/20013/it-s-a-record-breaker-guinness-says-match-com-leads-the#.Vi99yMuqdfQ. 
 46.  Online Dating Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.statisticbrain.com/online-dating-statistics/ (compiling statistics regarding online or 
Internet dating from Reuters, Herald News, PC World, and the Washington Post). 
 47.  Meredith Broussard, Dating Stats You Should Know, MATCH.COM (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.match.com/magazine/article/4671/; see also Online Dating Statistics, supra note 
46. 
 48.  See Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Julia Greenberg, 1 Billion People Used Facebook on Monday, WIRED (Aug. 27, 
2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/08/1-billion-people-used-facebook-monday/. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Social Media, supra note 43 (defining social media as “forms of electronic 
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network capacity may act similarly to bring people together. Google+, for 
instance, tries to enable “real-life sharing” via the Internet.53 It has 11 million 
followers.54 Wikipedia, a free encyclopedia derived solely through collaborative 
editing, brings together communities of interest around the topics listed, with 
thousands of edits entered hourly.55  
Social media also includes sites dedicated to the formation of interest 
groups. Initially, many of these simply provided users with access to products or 
services, such as music, photos, news stories, or games. But some have now 
evolved to build networks through common interests. Spotify users, for instance, 
can now share playlists. 56  At Shutterfly, groups can be formed, giving the 
members access to the same images and announcements, 57  while at Reddit, 
individuals can subscribe to subreddits to follow and to help drive the top 
stories.58 Even gaming communities can now come together while in the game 
itself, communicating with players half a world away. Thus, Overwolf features “a 
wide variety of epic apps, made by gamers,” to import social media. 59  The 
company promotes a JavaScript based software development kit (SDK) called 
KAIGOS (Kick Ass In Game Operating System), to encourage gamers to 
develop yet more apps for in-game social networking.60 
What is notable about social media sites is that they take private 
relationships and put them online. Beyond this, they create new relationships, 
 
communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users 
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content 
(as videos)). 
 53.  Google+ Features, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/+/learnmore/ 
circles/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 54.  Google+, GOOGLE, https://plus.google.com/+googleplus/about (last visited Nov. 1, 
2015). 
 55.  Wikipedia: Introduction, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Introduction (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 56.  See About Us, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact/ (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2015); How Do I Share Music With My Friends?, SPOTIFY, 
https://support.spotify.com/us/learn-more/guides/#!/article/sharing-music (last visited Oct. 31, 
2015). 
 57.  See Share Sites, SHUTTERFLY, https://www.shutterfly.com/sites/create/welcome. 
sfly?fid=7e3ac6c333a10e40 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 58.  See Jacob O’Gara, Reddit 101: A Beginner’s Guide to the Front Page of the Internet, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/reddit-101/. 
 59.  About Overwolf, OVERWOLF, http://www.overwolf.com/about-overwolf/ (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2015). 
 60.  Id. 
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which become digitally imprinted on the electronic sphere. So entire 
communities that never before existed have now come into being. And because 
they are digitized, they are accessible. 
Social media is not the only non-traditional form of data that contributes to 
SOCINT. It also may derive from communications metadata—that is, patterns in 
relationships that can be generated by paying attention to what individuals do in 
the course of their daily lives. Revealing whom one happens to call has not 
traditionally been regarded as particularly intimate data.61 But as the telephone 
has become more central to our lives, and the volume of calls between 
individuals has exponentially increased, more and more information can be 
gleaned from the length and frequency of contact, as well as patterns in calls.62 
Private details about individuals’ lives, and the broader networks within which 
they operate, can be uncovered by looking at other forms of communications 
metadata as well, such as email, text messaging, Skype, instant chats, and 
Internet browsing.63  
Another new source of social information centers on geolocational data, 
which can be gleaned from a variety of sources, such as radio-frequency 
identification (RFID) chips, global positioning systems, trunk identifier 
information, license plate readers, or CCTV paired with biometric identification 
systems.64 This type of information can reveal not just where an individual goes, 
and when they go there, but who they are with when they do so.65 These novel 
forms of data can be used to map social relationships.  
Second, SOCINT differs from traditional forms of intelligence in that it can 
serve as a starting point for socio-cultural knowledge generation.66  Owing to its 
 
 61.  See Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 863–65 (discussing Smith v. 
Maryland where the Supreme Court found an individual does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from one’s telephone). 
 62.  Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone 
Metadata, WEB POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-
sensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/. 
 63.  See Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Big Data, Metadata, and Traffic Analysis: What the 
NSA is Really Doing, ITWORLD (July 26, 2013), http://www.itworld.com/ 
article/2829511/big-data/big-data—metadata—and-traffic-analysis—what-the-nsa-is-really-
doing.html. 
 64.  See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 420–37 (2012). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See PATTON, supra note 15, at xiii; see also LEEELLEN FRIEDLAND, GARY W. SHAEFF 
& JESSICA GLICKEN TURNLEY, SOCIO-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A NEW INTELLIGENCE 
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volume, the sophistication of the algorithms that can be run on data, the types of 
information with which it can be combined (because it is both ordered and 
digitized), and the type of knowledge that can be generated, SOCINT goes well 
beyond what would have been digestible in a world of human intelligence 
(HUMINT) or even signal intelligence (SIGINT). Insights about which even the 
objects of the analysis may have little or no knowledge can be gleaned. In 
contrast, in traditional SIGINT, the parties to the communication are aware of 
what has been said.67 But those who form the nodes in SOCINT may be utterly 
ignorant of what can be gleaned from their behavior, as well as their relationship 
to other individuals and organizations in the network. 
The third distinguishing factor of SOCINT is that the data itself can be used 
to effect widespread political, economic, or social change.68 This is primarily 
done through using the data collected to identify critical nodes in the networks, 
which can then be neutralized, pressured, or otherwise persuaded to act in ways 
that use or fundamentally change the surrounding social network. It can do this 
because of the nature of digital networks. Social media provides a rich and 
diverse source of information that can be disseminated quickly, with little regard 
for geopolitical boundaries. Communication among participants can happen 
almost instantaneously, outside traditional regulatory regimes. And it can involve 
large numbers of people, which means that significant human resources can be 
mobilized. 
Because of these unique characteristics (the collection of novel forms of 
digital data with deep privacy implications, the use of SOCINT as a starting point 
for knowledge production, and the potential use of social intelligence to 
neutralize opposition or to effect political, economic, or social change), the 
power encapsulated in SOCINT goes well beyond the collection of other forms 
of intelligence. It constitutes a new type of knowledge.  
The collection of this data has massive implications. The power of social 
networks is gradually becoming apparent.69 One need look no further than the 
2001 convergence of protestors in Manilla, which prompted the Philippine 
 
PARADIGM, REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE AT THE MITRE CORPORATION MCLEAN, VIRGINIA, 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2006 (June 2007), available at 
http://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/07_1220.pdf. 
 67.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 68.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 69.  See Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public 
Sphere, and Political Change, FOREIGN AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs. 
com/articles/2010-12-20/political-power-social-media. 
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Congress to change its course and to impeach Philippine President Joseph 
Estrada.70 In Spain, demonstrations generated by text messaging resulted in the 
departure of Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar.71 The overthrow of the 
autocratic governments in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, known broadly as the 
“Arab Spring,” similarly relied on social networks for their execution.72 The risk 
is that individuals who can map and control such networks can accomplish 
massive changes in political, economic, and social structures. 
III. ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT STATUTORY FRAMING 
The framing for U.S. foreign intelligence collection falls into two broad 
(and at times overlapping) categories: the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (as amended),73 and Executive Order 12333, first introduced by President 
Reagan in 1981. 74  The former initially addressed only electronic 
communications. 75  Congress later expanded the statute to cover physical 
searches,76 the use of pen register and trap and trace devices,77 and the acquisition 
of business records.78 Post-9/11, the business records provision was altered to 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See generally PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., OPENING CLOSED REGIMES: WHAT WAS THE 
ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING THE ARAB SPRING? (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2595096. 
 73.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)). 
 74.  Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 75.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92 
Stat. 1783, 1786–88. 
 76.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108 
Stat. 3423, 3443–53 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829) (physical searches). 
 77.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601, 
112 Stat. 2396, 2404–10 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846) (pen register and trap 
and trace devices). 
 78.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 
112 Stat. 2396, 2410–12 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863) (business records). 
Various other amendments have been made. The USA PATRIOT Act, for instance, Section 
207 changed the duration of certain FISA authorization orders; Section 208 increased the 
number of FISC judges to 11; Section 214 amended FISA pen register and trap and trace 
provisions; Section 218 changed the purpose of electronic & physical searches; and Section 
504 authorized coordination between intelligence and law enforcement. ITRPA subsequently 
added a “lone wolf” provision via § 6001. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001, 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1801(b)(1) (2012)). 
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allow the government to obtain tangible goods.79 Together, these authorities are 
referred to as “Traditional FISA.” 
In 2008, the Administration convinced Congress that alterations to FISA 
were required to take account of the global nature of communications.80 The 
problem, the government argued, was that communications previously 
considered international, and thus not subject to FISA, might pass through the 
United States, thus forcing the intelligence community to go to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court for intercept permission. Accordingly, the 
government altered the statute to construct what is referred to as “Modern FISA,” 
which gives the government greater leeway when the target of the intercept is 
believed to be a non-U.S. person based outside the United States.81 
FISA does not directly address the collection of social intelligence. 82 
Instead, efforts have been made to shoehorn communications metadata collection 
into the business records, as well as pen register and trap and trace provisions, of 
Traditional FISA. 83  Such efforts proved ill founded. At the same time, the 
intelligence community has created collection programs under Modern FISA that 
include significant amounts of information about U.S. citizens’ social networks.84  
Outside of the FISA regime, Executive Order 12333, and its associated 
directives, provide the framing for surveillance programs that are heavily 
dependent on digitized social data. 85  The order, however, lacks sufficient 
particularity for handling the unique challenges of this type of information. 
A. Telephony Metadata Collection Under Section 215 
In June 2013, the Guardian published a copy of an order issued by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 86  requiring Verizon to turn over “an 
 
 79.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (tangible goods). 
 80.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)). 
 83.  See discussion infra Part III(A)–(B). 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
 86.  Verizon Forced to Hand over Telephone Data—Full Court Ruling, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/ 
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electronic copy of the following tangible things: all call detail records or 
‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon for communications (i) between the 
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls.”87 The order heralded the intelligence community’s entry into 
social intelligence collection in all but name. To find the authority to collect 
telephony metadata, the government interpreted the law in a manner that 
stretches credulity.  
When the order first reached the public domain, there was some confusion 
over its legal justification.88  Traditionally, the intelligence community had to 
demonstrate that the person about whom it was obtaining information was a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power before collection could 
commence.89  
What the Verizon order suggested was that collection did not have to be 
particularized.90 Intelligence agencies were collecting massive amounts of data to 
look for potential threats to the United States.91 The order, moreover, explicitly 
included telephone calls “wholly within the United States, including local 
telephone calls.”92 Although previously a higher level of protection had been 
extended to the collection of domestic content,93 under the terms of the order, no 
such distinguishing factor appeared to be applied in this case.94 
One clue to the order’s presumed legal nexus appeared in the phrase 
“tangible things.” 95  The term hearkens back to a clause added to the 1978 
 
jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order. 
 87.  In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things 
From Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., No. 13-80, at 2 (FISA Ct. 2013) [hereinafter In re 
Application of F.B.I], available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order. 
 88.  See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
 89.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012)). 
 90.  See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87. 
 91.  See Based on What We Know, Is the NSA Verizon Request Legal?, NPR.ORG (June 
15, 2013), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/06/15/191619038/based-on-what-
we-know-is-the-nsa-verizon-request-legal. 
 92.  See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87. 
 93.  Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 806. 
 94.  See id. at 803–04. 
 95.  See In Re Application of F.B.I., supra note 87. 
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in the aftermath of 9/11.96  But 
before the iconic USA PATRIOT Act weakened the constraints on the 
intelligence community, this section of FISA was known as the business records 
provision, introduced in response to an earlier terrorist attack.97 
In 1995, a right-wing extremist, Timothy McVeigh, placed a Ryder rental 
truck packed with a fertilizer bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City. 98  The explosion left 168 people dead and hundreds more 
injured.99 During the investigation, prosecutors were not clear on whether they 
had the authority to obtain McVeigh’s business records related to the truck rental, 
a storage unit that he maintained in Kansas, and his locker in Arizona. 100 
Although the attack was domestic, Congress altered FISA to authorize the 
production of certain types of business records related to individuals suspected of 
being foreign powers or agents of a foreign power.101 
Under the statute, applications for a court order had to “specify that . . . the 
records concerned [were] sought for an investigation [to gather foreign 
intelligence information or an investigation concerning international terrorism]; 
and there [were] specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the 
person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.”102 To limit the reach of orders, any records sought had to be for “an 
investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or an investigation 
concerning international terrorism.”103 The application established the potential 
involvement of the target in illegal activities.104 Congress required intelligence 
 
 96.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). 
 97.  See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 
602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863 (2012)). 
 98.  Douglas O. Linder, The Oklahoma City Bombing & the Trial of Timothy McVeigh 
(UMKC School of Law, Faculty Project 2006), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/ 
projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighaccount.html. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1329 (2004) (noting that in 1998 FISA was extended to include the kind 
of business records relevant to the Oklahoma City bombing investigation). 
 101.  See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 
602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2012)). 
 102.  Id. at § 602, 112 Stat. at 2411. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. As with the other provisions of traditional FISA, Congress assigned the terms 
“foreign power,” “agent of a foreign power,” “foreign intelligence information,” and 
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agencies to follow the same steps as those taken with regard to electronic 
surveillance—submitting an application to FISC to obtain an order, which then 
compels the company to hand over the records.105 
The statute limited the types of businesses on which the court could serve 
orders to include only common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage 
facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 106  Even so, the number of entities 
implicated was considerable. Common carriers includes any individual or 
company that transports people or things on regular routes, at set rates.107  It 
covers buses, taxis, commercial airplanes, passenger trains, cruise ships, 
railroads, and trucking companies.108 According to the DOJ, “places of public 
accommodation,” in turn, include more than 5 million establishments in the 
United States, “such as restaurants, hotels, theaters, convention centers, retail 
stores, shopping centers, dry cleaners, laundromats, pharmacies, doctors’ offices, 
hospitals, museums, libraries, parks, zoos, amusement parks, private schools, day 
care centers, health spas, and bowling alleys.”109 With regard to storage facilities, 
by 2015, there were more than 48,500 units, constituting the fastest growing 
segment of the commercial real estate industry over the past four decades.110 
Finally, as of 2014, car rental companies were in more than 21,000 locations, 
offering consumers access to more than 2 million cars.111 These companies reach 
into Americans’ daily lives, offering insight into matters ranging from medical 
issues and intimate relationships to financial conditions and travels.  
 
“international terrorism” the same meanings as employed in relation to electronic surveillance. 
Compare Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §101(a)–(c), (e), 
92 Stat. 1783, 1783–84 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 1801 (2012)), with Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). 
 105.  Compare Pub. L. No. 95-511, §102, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786–88, with Pub. L. No. 105-
272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12. 
 106.  See Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12. 
 107.  Id. at § 602, 112 Stat. at 2411. 
 108.  See What is a Common Carrier?, FINDLAW, http://injury.findlaw.com/torts-and-
personal-injuries/what-is-a-common-carrier.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 109.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Title III Highlights, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov 
/t3hilght.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
 110.  Fact Sheet, SELF STORAGE ASS’N, 
http://www.selfstorage.org/ssa/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutSSA/Factsheet/default.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2015). About 10.85 million households in the United States rent a self-
storage unit. Id. 
 111.  See 2014 U.S. Car Rental Market: Fleet, Locations and Revenue, AUTO RENTAL 
NEWS, http://www.autorentalnews.com/fileviewer/2014.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
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Despite claiming the necessity of the business records provision, the 
executive branch made little use of it, filing an application with FISC only once 
between 1998 and 2001.112 
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded what types of 
information could be obtained under the business records provision.113 The new 
clause authorized the FBI to apply for an order from FISC “requiring the 
production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, 
and other items).”114 This meant that the government could acquire any record—
be it business or personal.115  
Congress also eliminated the restrictions on the types of commercial 
entities that could be served with an order.116 Instead of just common carriers, 
public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities, 
orders could now be served on Internet service providers, grocery stores, 
libraries, booksellers, hotels, universities, and pharmacies—almost any 
institution or company.117 The Department of Justice quickly interpreted this to 
mean any company with a domestic office, as well as any data in the company’s 
“possession, custody, or control,” even if it was stored overseas.118 
The legislation, in addition, eliminated the requirement that the government 
demonstrate “specific and articulable facts” to the court that the target was a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.119 To the contrary, it only required 
 
 112.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS 
iii (March 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0703a/ 
final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215]. 
 113.  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)); U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 
215, supra note 112, at iii–iv. 
 114.  Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (emphasis added). 
 115.  See id. 
 116.  Compare Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2411–12 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861–1862 (2012)). 
 117.  See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at; U.S. D.O.J. REVIEW OF § 215, supra note 
112, at 7. 
 118.  See Cindy Cohn & Katitza Rodriguez, Department of Justice Misdirection on Cloud 
Computing and Privacy, EFF (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012 
/01/department-justice-misdirection-cloud-computing-and-privacy. 
 119.  Compare Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 
602, 112 Stat. at 2411–12, and U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215, supra note 112, at 8. 
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that the person seeking the information state the “records concerned are sought 
for an authorized investigation . . . to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities.” 120  Once the government provided its 
assurance, FISC became bound to grant the order.121 By eliminating the link 
between the records and the target of the investigation, the government could 
collect information about other people, not personally suspected of any 
wrongdoing, as long as it related to an authorized investigation.122 
The government filed its first application for a tangible things order in May 
2004.123 That year, DOJ obtained seven orders.124 In February 2005, it began 
using the authority in conjunction with pen register or trap and trace orders to 
obtain telephone subscriber information.125 In 2005, the court issued 141 of the 
combination orders. 126  The types of information obtained included driver’s 
license records, hotel records, apartment leases, credit card records, and 
subscriber information.127 
The pressure to harvest social intelligence pushed the government past the 
statutory language that governed the acquisition of business records.128 For the 
government to obtain an order, it must have “reasonable grounds to believe that 
the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a 
 
 120.  Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at 287–88. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See id. 
 123.  U.S. DOJ REVIEW OF § 215, supra note 112, at 17. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 35. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 67. The DOJ was quick to say that it had not obtained library or bookstore 
records, medical records, or gun sale records. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Calls on Congress to Renew Vital Provisions of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, JUSTICE.GOV (April 5, 2005), available at http://fas.org/irp/ 
news/2005/04/doj040505.html. 
 128.  For a more detailed exposition of this point, see Donohue, Metadata Collection, 
supra note 16, at 802. See also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d 
Cir. 2015); PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 171–72 (2014) 
[hereinafter PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 215 REPORT] (agreeing in 
conclusion). But see generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 
2006), available at https://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/doj11906wp.pdf (arguing legal 
justifications for the NSA program). 
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threat assessment).” 129  The word “relevant” played a crucial role. The 
government’s contention, which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
eventually accepted, was that all metadata was potentially relevant to 
investigations.130 Therefore, the government could collect all records.131  
The error in this logic is clear. Specifically, why would Congress bother to 
use the word “relevant” if all records are relevant? That is, under this 
interpretation, nothing would be irrelevant. And it would not just be telephony 
metadata that the government could obtain under the government’s interpretation, 
but all records, such as those related to banking or finance, education, and 
consumer purchases.132  
The government’s statutory interpretation similarly read the “reasonable 
grounds” requirement in the law out of existence.133 If all records were relevant, 
then there would be no further limitation to only certain records for which it was 
reasonable to think that they related to the collection regime.134 At the same time, 
the government’s interpretation treated investigations as a class—not as a 
particular investigation already under way, as required by statute.135 Further, the 
government collected information as part of a threat assessment—which was 
explicitly forbidden by statute.136 
The program ran counter to other aspects of the statute as well. The 
legislation required, for instance, that the government be able to otherwise obtain 
the tangible goods being sought via subpoena duces tecum. 137  A prosecutor, 
however, would not be able to convene a grand jury and to begin collecting 
telephony metadata, just to see if there was any illegal activity afoot 138 The 
Supreme Court has explicitly ruled that subpoenas may not be used for fishing 
 
 129.  USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012)). 
 130.  See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 15-75, at 14 (FISA Ct. 2015), available at 
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/BR%2015-75%20Misc%2015-
01%20Opinion%20and%20Order_0.pdf. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 841. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 849. 
 136.  Id. at 846–47. 
 137.  50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D) (2012). 
 138.  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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expeditions.139 
The telephony metadata program eviscerated the provisions of the statute 
that laid out what was required for installation and use of pen register or trap and 
trace devices.140 The former is a “device or process which records or decodes 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information”—i.e., the numbers dialed 
by a telephone.141 The latter “captures the incoming electronic or other impulses 
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling information.”142 That portion of FISA also allows the government to 
obtain other, related information.143 It must first, though, make a particularized 
showing in relation to the target about whom the information is going to be 
collected.144 A judicial decision must be made prior to collecting information ,145 
and heightened protections are given to U.S. persons.146  
By using the business records provision to obtain the same information—
without any evidence of a connection to a foreign power or particularized 
showing of wrongdoing—the government performed an end-run around other 
statutory provisions.147 
Despite the statutory violations, the NSA secretly collected telephony 
metadata in bulk. 148  The argument it offered to the FISC was that it was 
necessary to do this for national security purposes.149 Both secretly and in the 
public debate that later ensued, the government offered a haystack rationale: it 
was necessary to build a haystack to find individuals who posed a threat.150 In 
 
 139.  United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (“Grand juries are not 
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of investigation 
out of malice or an intent to harass.”). 
 140.  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846. 
 141.  18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). 
 142.  Id. § 3127(4). 
 143.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1)–(2). 
 144.  See id. § 1842(d)(2)(A). 
 145.  See id. § 1842(d)(1)–(2). 
 146.  Id. § 1842(c)(2). 
 147.  See id. § 1842(a)(2) (noting the authority under § 1842 is in addition to the authority 
to conduct electronic surveillance under FISA). 
 148.  In re Production of Tangible Things from (Redacted), No. BR 08-13, at 1–2 (FISA 
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at https://www.eff.org/document/br-08-13-order-3-2-09-final-
redactedex-ocr-0. 
 149.  Id. at 2. 
 150.  See Scott Neuman, Bush-Era NSA Chief Defends PRISM, Phone Metadata 
Collection, NPR (June 09, 2013), www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
 
  
1082 Drake Law Review [Vol. 63 
 
this case, the haystack was constructed of social relationships, the inspection of 
which might provide a clue to threats to U.S. national security. It was the 
structure itself that had to be constructed to generate information.151  
B. Additional Social Intelligence Programs 
In June 2015 Congress responded to the public furor that accompanied the 
revelation that the intelligence community had been collecting Americans’ 
telephone records by giving the government 180 days to end bulk telephony 
collection under Section 215.152 This program, however, is only one of myriad 
ways in which the government is attempting to assimilate Big Data to reveal 
deeper insights into the social fabric.153 
Starting in October 2001, President Bush operated a surveillance program 
entirely outside any statutory structure. Stellarwind collected telephone and 
Internet metadata, as well as telephone and Internet content.154 It was so secret, 
 
way/2013/06/09/190092800/bush-era-nsa-chief-defends-prism-phone-meta-data-collection. 
 151.  See id. 
 152.  See USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 103, 109, 129 Stat. 268, 272, 
276 (giving the government 180 days to end bulk collection of telephone records). 
 153.  Also note, the Section 215 telephony metadata program accounts for only 41 orders 
issued under Section 215, leaving 711 orders, still classified, potentially untouched. See 
LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE (forthcoming 2016). Additional 
telephony metadata programs exist. In January 2015, for instance, the DEA announced that it 
had been collecting telephony metadata between the United States and up to 116 different 
countries—in this case, apparently without any statutory authorization. Brad Heath, U.S. 
Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephone-surveillance-
operation/70808616/. 
 154.  President George W. Bush, Memorandum, Authorization for Specified Electronic 
Surveillance Activities During a Limited Period to Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism 
Within the United States (Oct. 4, 2001), cited in Office of the Inspector General, National 
Security Agency Central Security Service, ST-09-0002 Working Draft  1, 17–18 (2009), 
available at http://perma.cc/M3FC- QMHN. The Administration has publicly confirmed the 
inclusion of Internet and telephony metadata, and telephony content, as part of the program, 
but not Internet content. See Press Release, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Announces 
the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities Authorized by President George 
W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Dec. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/991-dni-
announces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-collection-activities-authorized-by-
president-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,2001; Unclassified 
Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National Security Agency, Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, No. 
08-cv-4373-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Fleisch Declaration], available at 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/21/fleisch2013jewelshubert 
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that for the first few years, the NSA itself was not allowed to read the Office of 
Legal Counsel’s (OLC) assessment of the legal grounds for the program, which 
had been provided to the President and Vice President.155 At that time, some of 
the attorneys at OLC had an anomalous view of executive power—positions that 
OLC has since repudiated.  
When questions were raised question about the legality and 
constitutionality of portions of Stellarwind, a concerted effort was made to force 
the collection of massive amounts of data into the existing FISA framework. The 
Internet metadata program was transferred to portions of the statute governing 
pen register and trap and trace devices.156 It did so by reading “relevant” in the 
same way that it later interpreted Section 215,157 stretching the meaning of the 
statutory language beyond common sense. Although the Internet metadata 
collection program formally ended in December 2011,158 international Internet 
metadata collection appears to have continued through a program called “EVIL 
OLIVE.”159 
To incorporate the collection of other social network data into FISA’s 
framing, the government re-defined “facility” to mean not a particular phone 
 
.pdf (using language identical to DNI press release); see also Second Redacted Declaration of 
Steven G. Bradbury, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 
2007) (No. 06-00214 HHK)), available at https://www.aclu.org 
/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu_v_doj_2nd_declaration_steven_bradbury.pdf. For further 
discussion of these programs, see DONOHUE, supra note 153; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra 
note 16. 
 155.  SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 184. 
 156.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion (Redacted), 6 
(FISA Ct.), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/ 
CLEANEDPRTT%202.pdf; see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Opinion and 
Order (Redacted),  2 (FISA Ct.), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents 
/1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf (original order); see also 50 USC §§1841–1846; Press 
Release, Dir. of National Intelligence, DNI Announces the Declassification of the Existence 
of Collection Activities Authorized by President George W. Bush Shortly After Attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Dec. 21, 2013), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/991-dni-
announces-the-declassification-of-the-exisitence-of-collection-activities-authorized-by-
president-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11,%202001. 
 157.  See FISC Order, supra note 156, at 29–31; see also Donohue, Metadata Collection, 
supra note 16, at 836–38; SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 197. 
 158.  See DONOHUE, supra note 153. 
 159.  Glenn Greenwald & Spencer Ackerman, How the NSA is Still Harvesting Your 
Online Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013 
/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection. 
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number or email address, but an entire gateway or cable head, 160  even as it 
transformed the meaning of “target” from relating to a particular individual, to 
entire groups, organizations, or networks.161  This last alteration meant that the 
government could use the roving wiretap provisions inserted into FISA post-9/11 
to wiretap any phone number or email address without first approaching the 
court.162 
Other efforts to collect social intelligence have occurred under Modern 
FISA. As aforementioned, in 2008, the Administration convinced Congress to 
pass the FAA to give it more flexibility to intercept international traffic. 163 
Section 702 of this statute allows the government to collect electronic 
communications on U.S. soil, where the target of the communications is not 
known to be a U.S. citizen and is believed to be located outside the United 
States.164  
Leaked documents suggest that the government has used this provision to 
engage in programmatic collection, gaining insight into citizens’ private 
relationships.165  According to the Director of National Intelligence, only one 
order has been issued under the section, naming 89,138 targets. 166  When 
 
 160.  SAVAGE, POWER WARS, supra note 16, at 201–202. 
 161.  Id. at 205–206. 
 162.  Id.; see also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (roving 
wiretap provision). 
 163.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438; See also Donohue, International Content, supra 
note 18. 
 164.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, §702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438. Under this provision, the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence may jointly authorize surveillance for up to one year. Id. at § 
702(a). The statute prohibits the NSA from conducting reverse-targeting (i.e., targeting 
someone outside the U.S. with the purpose of collecting the communications of a specific 
person inside the U.S.). Id. at § 702(b)(2). It prohibits the collection of entirely domestic 
communications. Id. at § 702(b)(4). 
 165.  See, e.g., NSA, Exhibit B: Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security 
Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence information Pursuant to 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (2009), 
available at http://perma.cc/F226-ASQ3; James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole 
Allows Warrantless Search for U.S. Citizens’ Emails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 
9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-
email-calls. 
 166.  OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT 
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communications have one person based overseas (known as “one end foreign” or 
“1EF”), communications to or from the United States with that entity can be 
collected.167 The NSA interprets the law to mean that it may not just collect 
information to or from the named targets, but any communications “about” the 
targets.168 So, if two people who have no relationship to the target happen to 
mention the target, or “selectors” associated with the target, then their 
communications are identified and collected. In order to find out who is 
mentioning the target, or selectors associated with the target, the NSA must 
monitor all communications—with the result that Americans’ international 
communications are subject to surveillance.  
Two programs in the public domain are currently associated with Section 
702. The first, PRISM, draws from Microsoft, Google, Yahoo!, Facebook, 
PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple—some of the largest 
communications providers, making the type of information that can be obtained 
substantial: email, video and voice chat, videos, photos, stored data, VoIP, file 
transfers, video conferencing, social networking details, and the like.169  
 
REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES: ANNUAL STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR 2013 (2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/tp/National_ 
Security_Authorities_Transparency_Report_CY2013.pdf. 
 167.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-261, §702, 122 Stat. 2436; see also Donohue, International Content, supra note 18. 
168. See NSA, Exhibit A: Procedures Used by the National Security Agency for Targeting 
Non-United States Persons Reasonably Believed to be Located Outside the United States to 
Acquire Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended (2009), available at http://perma.cc/E2NG-PU9P 
(“[I]n those cases where NSA seeks to acquire communications about the target that are not to 
or from the target, NSA will either employ an Internet Protocol filter to ensure that the person 
from whom it seeks to obtain foreign intelligence information is located overseas, or it will 
target Internet links that terminate in a foreign country.”); see also PRIVACY AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT 
TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 38 (2014) [hereinafter 
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 702 REPORT], available at 
http://www.pclob.gov/ 
Library/702-Report-2.pdf; Donohue, International Content, supra note 18, at 159. 
 169.  Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine 
U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-
internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-
d970ccb04497_story.html; Glen Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism program taps in 
to user data of Apple, Google and others, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. The Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Oversight Board later clarified, “Once foreign intelligence acquisition has been 
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The second, “upstream” collection under Section 702, amounts to 
collection from the servers of U.S. service providers.170 It allows the NSA to 
acquire Internet communications “as they transit the ‘internet backbone’ 
facilities.”171 It monitors all traffic crossing cables—not just information targeted 
at specific Internet protocol addresses or telephone numbers.172 By 2011, the 
NSA was acquiring around 26.5 million Internet transactions per year through 
upstream collection.173  
While the full scope of social network collection outside of FISA is not 
publicly known, documents leaked over the past two years show that massive 
amounts of data are being obtained under Executive Order 12333. Under one 
program (Mystic), the NSA collects metadata on all mobile communications to, 
from, and within the Bahamas, Mexico, Kenya, the Philippines, and elsewhere.174 
In some cases, the NSA also collects the content of all telephone calls to, from, 
and within entire countries. 175  A leaked NSA document notes that one such 
program processes over 100 million calls per day.176  
The data being collected includes email address books and contact lists, 
 
authorized under Section 702, the government sends written directives to electronic 
communication service providers compelling their assistance in the acquisition of 
communications.” PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., 702 REPORT, supra note 
168, at 7. 
 170.  See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion (Redacted),  
(FISA Ct. Sept. 2012) [hereinafter FISC Mem. Op. 2012], available at 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.pdf; Brett Max 
Kaufman, A Guide to What We Now Know About the NSA’s Dragnet Searches of Your 
Communications, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/guide-what-we-now-
know-about-nsas-dragnet-searches-your-communications. 
 171.  FISC Mem. Op. 2012, supra note 170170, at 26, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 
september_2012_fisc_opinion_and_order.pdf. 
 172.  See id. at 26–27. 
 173.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2011 WL 
10945618, at *26 (FISA Ct. 2011). 
 174.  Ryan Devereaux, Glenn Greenwald & Laura Poitras, Data Pirates of the Caribbean: 
The NSA is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, THE INTERCEPT (May 19, 
2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-
every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/. 
 175.  Id.; see also Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Surveillance Program Reaches 
‘Into the Past’ to Retrieve, Replay Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-
into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-
76adc9210f19_story.html. 
 176.  Devereaux, Greenwald & Poitras,  supra note 174.174 
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which can be analyzed to build robust social models. In conjunction with the 
NSA’s UK counterpart, General Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), for 
example, the government appears to be tapping Yahoo and Google’s internal 
networks to harvest address books and instant messaging contact lists, 
implicating hundreds of millions of customers.177  
According to a leaked, internal NSA slide presentation, in a single day in 
2012, NSA’s Special Source Operations branch collected nearly half a million 
address books from Yahoo, more than 100,000 from Hotmail, approximately 
82,000 from Facebook, another 33,000 from Gmail, and some 23,000 from other 
providers. 178  Muscular, as the program is called, holds the information in a 
temporary buffer, where it is scanned for certain information.179 Data considered 
relevant is then sent back to the NSA.180 The volume is considerable: between 
December 2012 and January 2013, more than 181 million new records were 
obtained in this way.181 
Webcam images and chat sessions are also appear to be collected under 
Executive Order 12333. GCHQ files from 2008 to 2010 reference a program 
called Optic Nerve, in which Yahoo webcam chats were collected in bulk, 
regardless of whether the individual user was a foreign intelligence target.182 
During one six-month period, GCHQ, with the help of the NSA, collected visual 
data from more than 1.8 million Yahoo user accounts around the world.183 The 
system began as an experiment in automated facial recognition, with one image 
 
 177.  Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books 
Globally, WASH. POST (Oct 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-
globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data 
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-
google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-
8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Spencer Ackerman & James Ball, Optic Nerve: Millions of Yahoo Webcam Images 
Intercepted by GCHQ, THE GUARDIAN (Feb 28, 2014),  http://www.theguardian 
.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo. 
 183.  Id. As a domestic matter, there are no restrictions on the NSA’s collection of 
information on British subjects, just as there are no British restrictions on GCHQ’s collection 
of information on American citizens. Id. 
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every five minutes selected from users’ feeds.184 Access to all Yahoo webcam 
images or events provided the agencies with insight into online users.185 The 
information was then fed into NSA’s XKeyscore search tool.186 
Text messages similarly are not immune. In 2011, an internal slide 
presentation at the NSA referred to SMS Text Messages “A Goldmine to 
Exploit.”187 Under Executive Order 12333, the NSA has collected almost 200 
million text messages per day, globally, using them to ascertain location, travel 
plans, social networks, and credit card details. 188  Like the bulk collection of 
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the SMS 
message program, codenamed Dishfire, is not targeted.189  
In addition to direct text messages, the program provides the government 
with access to missed-call alerts, which can be used to conduct contact-chaining 
analysis, to determine international movement (e.g., from network roaming 
alerts), or to obtain electronic business cards, financial transactions, or 
geolocation data from requests by people for route information or to set up 
meetings.190 
The NSA also collects geolocational information. Nearly 5 billion records 
per day help the agency to find mobile phones around the world, and to map 
relationships between mobile telephone users.191 By some accounts, the agency 
has more than 27 terabytes of data associated with this program.192  
 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. Private, sexually explicit webcam material proved to be a particular challenge: 
between 3 percent and 11 percent of the Yahoo webcam imagery obtained by GCHQ 
contained “undesirable nudity.” Id. 
 187.  See NSA Dishfire Presentation on Text Message Collection—Key Extracts, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2014/jan/16 
/nsa-dishfire-text-messages-documents. 
 188.  James Ball, NSA Collects Millions of Text Messages Daily in ‘Untargeted’ Global 
Sweep, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep; see also 
Dishfire Presentation, supra note 187. 
 189.  Ball,  supra note 188; see also Dishfire Presentation, supra note 187. 
 190.  Ball,  supra note 188. 
 191.  Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, 
Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-
worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-
c6ca94801fac_story.html. 
 192.  Id.; see also FASCIA: The NSA’s Huge Trove of Location Records, WASH. POST, 
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The NSA has constructed databases to house this social network 
information. XKeyscore appears to have the widest-reaching collection of online 
information.193 It includes Digital Network Intelligence—understood as “nearly 
everything a typical user does on the internet,” such as email, social media, chats, 
websites visited, and metadata. 194  The amount of information is staggering. 
William Binney, a former mathematician at the NSA, said in 2012 that, looking 
solely at phone calls and emails, the agency had “assembled on the order of 20 
trillion transactions about U.S. citizens with other U.S. citizens.”195  At some 
sites, the amount of data obtained daily is so massive (more than 20 terabytes), 
that it can only be stored for short periods.196 
These programs signal the dawn of a new age of intelligence collection—
one centered on the acquisition and analysis of digitized information about social 
relationships. Significant risks attend. 
IV. THE DANGERS OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
Social network construction and analysis can reveal our most intimate 
details.197 Social intelligence derives, in part, from the type of information at 
issue in the telephony metadata program.198 In many ways, such data is more 
devastating than pure content.  
As Stewart Baker, NSA’s former general counsel, stated,, “Metadata 
absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life.”199 Baker concluded, “If 
you have enough metadata you don’t really need content . . . . [It’s] sort of 
embarrassing how predictable we are as human beings.” 200  General Michael 
Hayden concurred, stating Baker was “absolutely correct.” 201  Hayden added, 
 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/what-is-fascia/637 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 193.  Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 30. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Glenn Greenwald, Are All Telephone Calls Recorded and Accessible to the US 
Government?, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/comment 
isfree/2013/may/04/telephone-calls-recorded-fbi-boston. 
 196.  Greenwald, XKeyscore, supra note 30. 
 197.  See Written Testimony of Edward W. Felten, United States Senate, Committee on the 
Judiciary Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 113th 
Cong. 7–8 (2013) [hereinafter Written Testimony]. 
 198.  Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62. 
 199.  Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV.  BOOKS (Nov. 21, 
2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/21/snowden-leaks-and-public/. 
 200.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 201.  David Cole, ‘We Kill People Based on Metadata,’ N.Y. REV.  BOOKS (May 10, 
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“We kill people based on metadata.”202  
Even if citizens want to prevent their metadata from being collected, it 
would be almost impossible to do so.203 Encryption is advancing; however, most 
of its trajectory centers on protecting content—not metadata.204 The only realistic 
option therefore is to refrain from using digital technology.205 Doing so, however, 
would mean rejecting the contemporary world, with potentially devastating 
consequences for one’s relationships, employment, and personal affairs.206 
Metadata matters because it offers reliable information about a broad range 
of behavior, offering insight into what we have done, as well as what we are 
likely to do.207 Social media does the same, as does pattern analysis based on 
movement. A tremendous amount of information can be conveyed, in the process 
creating vulnerabilities. 
A. What Analytics Can Demonstrate 
Even seemingly innocuous data, like the telephony metadata at issue in the 
Section 215 program, can carry with it deep implications for individual privacy. 
A study conducted in 2015 by computer scientists at Stanford University 
determined that “phone metadata is unambiguously sensitive,” even when 
collected for three months on just over 500 people.208 The researchers were able 
to attribute a range of medical conditions and beliefs to the participants in the 
 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/. 
 202.  Id. For a discussion of the use of telephony metadata in signature strikes (predator 
drone strikes based on SIGINT and patterns of behavior), see Dana Priest, NSA Growth 
Fueled by Need to Target Terrorists, WASH. POST (July 21, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-growth-fueled-by-need-to-target-
terrorists/2013/07/21/24c93cf4-f0b1-11e2-bed3-b9b6fe264871_story.html; Jeremy Scahill & 
Glenn Greenwald, NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination Program, THE INTERCEPT 
(Feb. 9, 2014), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/. 
 203.  Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 874; Decl. of Prof. Edward Felton 
at ¶¶ 30–37, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 
13-cv-03994), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013 
.08.26%20ACLU%20PI%20Brief%20-%20Declaration%20-%20Felten.pdf. 
 204.  Donohue, Metadata Collection, supra note 16, at 874. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See, e.g., Decl. of Prof. Edward Felton, supra note 203, at 58; Klayman v. Obama, 
957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, No. 14-5004, 2015 WL 
5058403 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
724, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 208.  Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 62. 
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study, based solely on telephony metadata.209 Calls to health services, financial 
services, pharmacies, sexually transmitted disease clinics, divorce lawyers, strip 
clubs, recruiting and job placement organizations, and religious organizations—
even alone—provide inferential information about a person.210 
Patterns in the numbers dialed and received reveal even more. 211  One 
person in the Stanford study talked to cardiologists, then telephoned a medical 
laboratory, after which the subject received calls from a pharmacy, and later 
telephoned a cardiac arrhythmia device home reporting hotline. 212  Another 
person called a firearms store known for selling AR-15 semiautomatic rifles, 
prior to calling a gun manufacturer’s customer service. 213  Another subject 
contacted a home improvement store, a locksmith, a dealer for hydroponics, and 
a head shop.214 A fourth person talked for a considerable amount of time to her 
sister. 215  Forty-eight hours later, she telephoned Planned Parenthood. 216  Two 
weeks afterwards, she called the clinic a few times, and a month later called one 
last time.217 
The metadata represented a small sample, over a short period, with a 
limited number of calls. Nevertheless, it revealed participants’ heart conditions, 
gun purchases, cannabis cultivation, and decision to have an abortion.218  
The collection of Internet and telephony metadata allows the government to 
engage in social network analysis, building a detailed picture of citizens’ 
connectedness to each other—of what types of issues matter to us—and of our 
stature in the social fabric.219 The ability to do so relates to the rapid growth of 
new technologies and scholarly fields. 220  Digital platforms have created the 
potential for mass communication. 221  The Internet distributes worldwide 
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 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  See Written Testimony, supra not207e 197, at 10–11. 
 220.  See DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 2 (2d ed. 2008). 
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communications at the speed of light. In light of these advances, publications 
centered on social network analytics have exponentially accelerated.222 “[S]everal 
hundred papers in physics, mathematics, computer science, biology, economics, 
and sociology” 223  and numerous books, have put forward new theories and 
algorithms contributing to the evolution of network science. 224  Powerful 
advances in computing, such as the advent of the cloud industry, which gives 
users access to supercomputers around the globe and the ability to process 
information, mean that massive datasets can now be built and mined to generate 
new knowledge.225 More details about social behavior can be learned.226 
These technologies are so strong that they may produce information that 
individuals do not even know about themselves. They may not know how 
important they are in the formal and informal groups of which they are a part. 
But this can now be measured. A variable called “centrality” can be calculated to 
ascertain their relative worth and to provide insight into how influential they may 
be.227 There are different ways in which centrality can be measured.228 How short 
the paths are between people, how many links they have to others, and how close 
they are to other potentially powerful people in the network provide insight into 
how much power they wield—and how they may exercise it. 229  Structural 
cohesion generates insight.230 
People may not realize their own habits, or the seriousness with which they 
view certain issues, but both may become clear by the frequency with which they 
act on their interests and beliefs. They may not know how dependent they are on 
certain relationships. They may not be aware of the degree of power that others 
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have over them, or that they have over others. They may not have insight into 
connections between those with whom they are linked and others, or how closely 
others, with whom they are connected, are tied into groups whose interests they 
oppose or do not share.231 They may be unaware that some of those who are in 
their group of associates are only in contact with them for instrumental reasons, 
using the relationship to secure goods, services, or information for purposes that 
are masked from their view. They may not be able to see others, virtual strangers 
to them, who have a significant amount of power over their activities and their 
ability to pursue their interests, simply because of these strangers’ centrality in 
networks of which all are a part.232 
Social network analytics allow people to find patterns in relations that 
evolve over time. 233  Analysis may focus on individuals, small groups, 
organizations, or even entire countries. 234  When all Internet or telephony 
metadata is collected, the unit under consideration could be any number, or 
configuration of individuals.235 
The basic idea is that the regular patterns of relations between different 
points provide a macrosocial context—or overall structure—which, in turn, 
influences individuals’ precepts, beliefs, decisions, and actions.236 As one scholar 
explains: “The central objectives of network analysis are to measure and 
represent these structural relations accurately, and to explain both why they occur 
and . . . their consequences.”237 Structure matters more than an individual’s age, 
gender, or ideology.238 It reveals how powerful individuals may be in ways that 
may not otherwise be obvious.239 A woman holding a menial job that does not 
require a significant amount of initiative may be a strong member of the 
neighborhood organization or the parent-teacher association.240 Social network 
analysis provides insight into how social status and strength—even of the same 
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person—may vary across contexts.241 
Social network analytics carry with them a tremendous amount of power.242 
If one political party accesses the telephone records of the opposing party, it can 
identify the most powerful actors and then find a way either to alter their 
behavior or to separate them from the network.243 Doing so could disrupt political 
opposition. It could be done in quite visible ways, such as finding evidence of 
illegal behavior and initiating prosecution against the target—or in less visible 
ways, such as pressuring the surrounding network to get the target to act in a 
certain way. 
B. What Analytics Can Do 
One of the insights discovered by social science is that relationships with 
others influence perceptions, beliefs, and actions.244 The stronger the connection 
with others, or the more intense the interaction with them, the more susceptible 
people are to their influence. 245  As a result, identifying high intensity 
relationships offers a lever to change others’ behavior.246 
Behavior modification can be done not just for one person, but for a series 
of individuals with a high level of centrality in social networks. Those who 
control such corridors, or pathways, can put themselves in a position of social (or 
political) control. 247  The scholarly literature is full of examples of how 
controlling structural relations generates competitive, or cooperative, behavior—
whether it is in political movements, drug trafficking networks, terrorist 
campaigns, or even regular corporate environments.248  
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The power of social networks to affect political change has already been 
demonstrated in the Philippines, Spain, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. 249 
Concerted development or study of social networks as a prelude to action opens a 
new door of vulnerability. The government can use social networks to force 
political, economic, and social change. The U.S. has already conducted 
programs, based on SOCINT, to try to build and then to influence the powerful 
nodes in social networks.250 The aim of the enterprise was to counter political 
opposition to the United States.251  
In 2010 the U.S. government created a “Twitter” to generate a social 
network in Cuba that could then be manipulated to undermine the government.252 
The Associated Press, which reported on the project, reviewed more than 1,000 
pages of documentation and conducted multiple interviews with people 
involved.253 It found that it was not the CIA behind the initiative, but USAID, a 
development agency—not even a formal part of the intelligence community 
structure.254  
The program was called ZunZuneo, which is slang in Cuban for the noise 
made by a hummingbird.255 It began by “tweeting” soccer results, music, and 
weather reports—all rather benign.256 Once ZunZuneo reached a critical mass of 
Cuban subscribers, though, the plan was to begin inserting content that would 
create “smart mobs,” which could be mobilized at will, to trigger a “Cuban 
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spring.”257 The purpose of the program was to “renegotiate the balance of power 
between the state and society.”258 
USAID went to great lengths to mask the role of the U.S. government—
including from Congress itself. 259  The legislature had become increasingly 
concerned about the agency’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which it stood up 
just after the fall of the Soviet Union to promote U.S. interests abroad.260 Staff 
Members of the Senate Foreign Relations recount how they could not even find 
out in broad terms what USAID was doing.261 Senator Patrick Leahy, Chair of 
the Appropriations Committee’s State Department and Foreign Operations 
subcommittee did not know about the program—even though his subcommittee 
ostensibly had oversight of it.262 
USAID similarly tried to infiltrate the underground hip-hop scene in Cuba, 
to spark a youth movement to overthrow President Raul Castro. 263  These 
initiatives were done secretly, without Congressional oversight—and billed not 
as covert action, but as an attempt to build civil society in Cuba.264 The purpose 
was to gain social and political control.265 
The collection of SOCINT offers the government a rich opportunity to 
leverage the information because social networks are not static. 266  They are 
continually evolving.267 Therefore, they can be used to manipulate and to alter 
individual and organizational behavior. 268  They offer insight into specific 
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attributes—such as what individuals like, or do not like, to do—as well as 
relations between people and groups, and characteristics of the type of 
connectedness in question.269 What is the nature of the relationship between two 
people? Trust? Advice? Support? Or betrayal? Social network analytics provide a 
context for relationships.270 
Since 9/11, much attention has been paid to how to use network analysis to 
respond to threats to U.S. national security.271 One conclusion that researches 
have reached is that it is difficult to obtain information about highly secretive, 
global organizations that make it a point not to post data on otherwise publicly 
available sites.272 But networks of all kinds have to communicate—after all, that 
is what makes them a network—and global communication systems analytics 
offer one way forward. Thus, we find ourselves in an age of social intelligence. 
There are numerous difficulties with this approach. First, in some ways, it 
has not been particularly effective.273 While the government initially claimed that 
the telephony metadata program was a critical part of discovering and thwarting 
dozens of planned attacks, after Congressional scrutiny, only one instance could 
be produced where the government had used the Section 215 program to identify 
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a terrorist.274 Basaaly Moalin, a cab driver in San Diego, donated money to al-
Shabab in Somalia. 275  Even this example was weak: for two months after 
discovering Moalin’s complicity in terrorist actions overseas, the FBI declined to 
take any further action.276 
Scholars and experts have looked into the question and concluded that, as a 
means of uncovering terrorist plots, communications metadata, in particular, is 
full of weaknesses.277 In 2008, the National Research Council of the Academies 
of Science released the results of an intensive study conducted by prominent 
academics in computer science, data mining, behavioral science, terrorism, and 
law.278 “Modern data collection and analysis techniques,” the final report stated, 
“have had remarkable success in solving information-related problems in the 
commercial sector. . . . But such highly automated tools and techniques cannot be 
easily applied to the much more difficult problem of detecting and preempting a 
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terrorist attack, and success in doing so may not be possible at all.”279  The 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), after looking carefully at 
the NSA’s telephony metadata program, similarly determined that it “has not 
proven useful in identifying unknown terrorists or terrorist plots.” 280  To the 
contrary, information obtained through querying the metadata merely confirmed 
relationships that had already been determined through other means.281 Weighed 
against the government’s potential use of the information for myriad purposes, 
the PCLOB called for an end to the program.282 
The lack of effectiveness of bulk collection of metadata has been echoed by 
a number of studies. The New America Foundation, for instance, analyzed 225 
individuals recruited by al Qaeda and similar organizations and subsequently 
charged with terrorism.283 “Traditional investigative methods, such as the use of 
informants, tips from local communities, and targeted intelligence operations, 
provided the initial [identification of the individuals],” even as the bulk collection 
program provided minimal help.284 “Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of 
American telephone metadata,” the Foundation explained, “appears to have 
played an identifiable role in initiating, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases.”285  
One possible reason that metadata may not be effective for 
counterterrorism stems from the “snowballing” method adopted by the 
government.286 Agents identify a particular telephone number, find associated 
numbers, and then determine the numbers to which those numbers are linked. 
The problem is that this approach is biased towards highly connected 
networks. 287  Terrorist organizations, however, commonly work along a cell 
structure, in which there are relatively weak connections between actors.288 It is 
not the most connected that are likely to engage in terrorist activity, but those on 
the periphery that are more likely to be involved in violence.289 A similar claim 
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has been made about Islamist networks—that they are sparsely populated and 
structured along a cell system.290 
A second, important consideration is that every person in the United States 
relies on communications networks to go about their daily lives. It would be 
difficult to live in the contemporary world without a telephone or access to the 
Internet. And so, it is not just potential terrorists’ metadata that is collected (and 
for which such a method is significantly flawed), but all Americans’ data. 
Citizens find their most intimate lives exposed to the government.291  Unlike 
Islamist organizations, which often have sparse communication networks and, 
because of their structure, are not as vulnerable to social network analytics, 
ordinary citizens’ social networks may be extremely dense, generating much 
more—and more intimate—information. 292  The cost is borne by individual 
liberty and inroads into privacy. 
V. FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES 
 While the technological capabilities of social network mapping are 
revolutionary, the concerns that accompany the growth of the field are far from 
new. The Founders introduced the Fourth Amendment to protect against the 
danger that the government could cast about for information, which it could then 
use to bring criminal charges.293 The Founders were deeply concerned about the 
potential harms caused by allowing the government access to citizens’ private 
lives.  Doing so threatened solitude, intimate relations, and even democratic 
deliberation. It was too much power to put into one place. In taking the position 
that they did, the Founders drew heavily from their English legacy.294  
A. Prohibition on General Warrants 
A general warrant is a document, issued by a court or by the executive 
branch, giving officials the broad authority to search for and to seize private 
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documents, without any prior, specific evidence of wrongdoing.295  It does not 
specify, with particularity, the person or place to be searched, or the papers or 
records to be seized. 296   It is not supported by oath or affirmation of any 
wrongdoing.297   
For hundreds of years prior to the founding, English jurists considered 
general warrants to be a violation of the British Constitution.298 Thus it was that 
Sir Edward Coke insisted in Parliament that the Petition of Right include a clause 
prohibiting promiscuous search and seizure.299 It was against the Reason of the 
Common Law (and thus “unreasonable”) to allow for such instruments. No royal 
prerogative, or reason of state, could justify such tyrannical instruments: 
 [I]f [imprisonment] be per mandatum domini regis, or ‘for matter of 
state’; and then we are gone, and we are in a worse case than ever. If we 
agree to this imprisonment ‘for matters of state’ and ‘a convenient time,’ we 
shall leave Magna Carta and the other statutes and make them fruitless, and 
do what our ancestors would never do.300 
Coke returned to these arguments in his Institutes of the Laws of England, writing 
that to issue a general warrant is against Magna Carta.301 
In 1678, Sir Matthew Hale similarly condemned general warrants in the 
first volume of his Pleas of the Crown: or, A Methodical Summary of the 
Principal Matters Relating to that Subject. 302  Later, in Historia Placitorum 
Coronæ (History of the Pleas of the Crown), Hale wrote, “[A] general warrant to 
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search in all suspected places is not good, but only to search in such particular 
places, where the party assigns before the justice his suspicion and the probable 
cause thereof, for these warrants are judicial acts, and must be granted upon 
examination of the fact.”303 
It was to Hale’s writing that Lord Chief Justice Mansfield famously 
appealed in the case of Money v. Leach.304 In other cases, such as Entick v. 
Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, the English law lords repeatedly rejected general 
warrants.305 Similarly, it was to Coke and Hale that Serjeant-at-Law William 
Hawkins appealed in his Pleas of the Crown to state the illegality of general 
warrants: “I do not find any good Authority, That a Justice can justify sending a 
general Warrant to search all suspected Houses in general for stolen Goods.”306 
Probable cause must first be demonstrated (under oath), particularity attached, 
and a specific warrant issued.307 A number of influential English legal treatises 
and abridgements followed Hawkins’s Pleas, condemning general warrants.308 
By the time of the founding, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England announced that the question had been well settled: 
Sir Edward Coke indeed has laid it down that a justice of the peace cannot 
issue a warrant to apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion; no, not even till an 
indictment be actually found: and the contrary practice is by others held to 
be grounded rather upon connivance than the express rule of law; though 
now by long custom established.309  
For Blackstone, “A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without 
naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for its 
uncertainty; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not to be left to the 
officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion.”310  
The rejection of general warrants traversed the Atlantic. When the Crown 
tried to make greater use of promiscuous search and seizure to crack down on 
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smuggling, colonists rejected the practice as contrary to their rights as 
Englishmen.311  
James Otis’s speech challenging the Crown’s use of general warrants is one 
of the most famous orations in U.S. history. 312  More than five decades 
afterwards, John Adams, who had been present at the time, related, “Otis was a 
flame of fire!”313 His performance had “breathed into this nation the breath of 
life.”314 Adams declared, “Then and there was the first scene of the first act of 
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child 
Independence was born.”315 
Otis attacked the idea that the government could simply collect information 
to try to find evidence of wrongdoing: “I will to my dying day oppose with all the 
powers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments of slavery on the 
one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is.”316 The writ of 
assistance was “the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of 
English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an 
English law-book.”317 
The writs created the potential for misuse of the power for personal 
purposes.318  Otis lamented, “Every man, prompted by revenge, ill humor, or 
wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, may get a writ of 
assistance. Others will ask it from self-defence; one arbitrary exertion will 
provoke another, until society be involved in tumult and blood.”319 Otis echoed 
Coke: the Reason of the Common Law demanded that the Court find such 
instruments illegal.320  
 
 311.  See, e.g., Circular from William Pitt to Francis Bernard (Aug. 23, 1760), in THE 
PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD: GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, at 52–
53 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2007) [hereinafter Circular from William Pitt]; JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., 
REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE 
PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 407–08 (Samuel M. Quincy 
ed., 1865); see also Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293. 
 312.  See id. 
 313.  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 314.  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 315.  Id. at 248. 
 316.  2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1865). 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  See id. at 524–25. 
 319.  Id. 
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The colonists’ rejection of general warrants did not end with the founding. 
In Virginia, Patrick Henry, George Washington, Edmund Pendleton, George 
Mason, George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, and Thomas Jefferson, among 
others, adopted a provision in the Virginia Declaration of Rights condemning 
general warrants.321 In Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin, George Bryan, James 
Cannon, Thomas Paine, and others did the same.322 The newly formed states of 
Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire all banned general warrants.323  
Early Americans repeatedly articulated the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search and seizure as the grounds on which general warrants would 
not be allowed. 324  As Adams wrote in the Massachusetts document, “Every 
subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his 
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”325 
“Unreasonable” here had a particular meaning: namely, against reason or 
opposed to common law.326 General warrants violated the common law.327 The 
Massachusetts Constitution continued, 
 All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or 
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and 
if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected 
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, 
be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of 
search, arrest, or seizure . . . .328 
By using “therefore” in this way, Adams underscored that it was to ensure the 
right against unreasonable search and seizure, that general warrants, and special 
warrants lacking an oath, evidence, and particularity with regard to the persons to 
 
 321.  See VA. CONST. art. I, § 10; Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: Virginia, 
UM-KC, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/marryvirginia.html (last visited 
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html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 323.  See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 17; MD. CONST. art. I, § 23; N.H. CONST. of 1784 Pt. I, art. 
XIX; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 324.  See, e.g., supra note 275 & accompanying text. 
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 326.  See Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 293. 
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be arrested or places to be searched, would not be allowed. 329  The state 
constitution added, “[A]nd no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with 
the formalities prescribed by the laws.”330 Only warrants that comported with the 
requisite particularity, supported by oath, would be valid. 331 These state 
declarations transformed the colonists’ objection to general warrants into a 
positive right.332  
In 1787, the new constitution transformed federal power.333 The ratification 
debates immediately seized on whether a prohibition on general warrants would 
be required to protect individual rights.334 In Virginia, Patrick Henry demanded 
that a bill of rights be adopted to preserve the rights and privileges of the 
people.335 He worried that government officials could go into citizens “cellars 
and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure every thing you eat, drink, and 
wear.”336 “I feel myself distressed,” he admitted, 
because the necessity of securing our personal rights seems not to have 
pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable things are omitted. For 
instance, general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places, 
without evidence of the commission of a fact . . . .337 
Property could be taken “in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or 
reason.”338 Everything considered sacred could “be searched and ransacked by 
the strong hand of power.”339 Delegates agreed.340 Virginia proposed that a bill of 
rights, which included a prohibition on general warrants, be adopted.341 
In New York, a “Son of Liberty” predicted that general warrants would be 
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 330.  Id. 
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XIV. 
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 334.  See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS: ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 468, 658 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901). 
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one of the curses that would “be entailed on the people of America, by this 
preposterous and newfangled system, if they are ever so infatuated as to receive 
it.”342 According to the writer, “Men of all ranks and conditions, subject to have 
their houses searched by officers, acting under the sanction of general warrants, 
their private papers seized, and themselves dragged to prison, under various 
pretences, whenever the fear of their lordly masters shall suggest, that they are 
plotting mischief against their arbitrary conduct.”343  
The New York convention went so far as to insist that it was only with the 
understanding that Congress would amend the Constitution to take account of the 
right against general search, and others laid out in its ratification document, that 
it consented to the new Constitution. 344  The convention attached a military 
reservation to make it clear that it did not make its representation lightly.345  
Rhode Island, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania followed suit.346 
In the last, Samuel Bryan, an Anti-Federalist writing as “Centinel,” repeatedly 
raised a similar concern.347 He wrote, “Your present frame of government secures 
you to a right to hold yourselves, houses, papers and possessions free from search 
and seizure.”348 Bryan explained, “therefore warrants granted without oaths or 
affirmations first made, affording sufficient foundation for them . . . shall not be 
granted.” 349  The right against promiscuous search and seizure hung in the 
balance: “whether your papers, your persons, and your property, are to be held 
sacred and free from general warrants, you are now to determine.”350 Madison 
incorporated these concerns into what is now the Fourth Amendment.351 
 
 342.  A Son of Liberty, NEW YORK JOURNAL, Nov. 8, 1787, reprinted in 1 VOLUME XIX, 
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 348.  Centinel, No. 1, (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 349 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
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The collection of SOCINT raises constitutional concerns in the extent to 
which it results in private information being collected by the government without 
evidence of prior wrongdoing. 352  Nor do the SOCINT programs underway 
specify the individual about whom information is to be obtained; instead, 
information is generally collected about everyone, with the hope of uncovering 
illegal activity. That this information is now being queried using U.S. person 
information, for criminal matters unrelated to foreign intelligence collection, 
further underscores the deep constitutional questions at stake. 
It was precisely to prevent the government from collecting massive 
amounts of information that the Founders adopted the Fourth Amendment.353 
They were concerned about the potential use of such information for political 
purposes—to head off opposition to the government, or to the government’s 
political, social, or economic agenda.354 One of the dangers they perceived was 
precisely that at issue in the ZunZuneo case: that the information could be used 
for political purposes.355 
New and emerging technologies magnify the Founders’ concerns. Not only 
could the collection of private information cause great mischief, but the 
digitization of so much information has also deepened privacy interests.356 It is 
not just the details about an individual with whom one is in correspondence, but 
the details of everyone with whom citizens communicate, their degree of power 
in different networks, and the strength of their relationships with other people 
and entities.357 
In the post-Snowden era, one example of SOCINT that has gained 
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prominence among scholars revolves around Paul Revere.358 What, exactly, was 
his role in the Revolution? It turns out that he was more than just a messenger.359 
Using the membership rosters of Whig groups, social network scholars have 
demonstrated that Revere was a key link between revolutionary entities, spanning 
different social strata and connecting disparate organizations. 360  As such, he 
played a central role in forging the movement.361 As Shin-Kap Han, a Professor 
of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, pointed out, the 
key question was not who Revere was, but how and why he mattered to the 
underlying structure and, in turn, to the outcome of the movement. 362  When 
mapped, Revere’s centrality to the Revolution becomes clear. 
In 1776, the British Government did not have access to the types of digital 
information and algorithmic analytics that today mark the field.363 Whether an 
individual was involved in the St. Andrews Lodge, the Loyal Nine, the North 
Caucus, the Long Room Club, the Tea Party, or the Boston Committee, might 
have been available on a limited bases because of HUMINT. 364  The social 
network analytics that would have given this information deeper meaning, 
though, had yet to be constructed.365  
Some commentators have pointed to the Revere data as evidence for why 
SOCINT ought to be collected.366 The Revolutionists, after all, were engaged in a 
violent upheaval against the government.367 Others see the potential as precisely 
the type of government overreach that justified the Revolution in the first 
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place.368  
Whatever one’s take on the data might be, at a minimum, it is clear that 
SOCINT offers an incredibly powerful tool—one that is qualitatively different 
from other forms of intelligence, and one that carries with it the potential for 
devastating harm. Equally important are the rights implications underlying the 
collection of such information in the first place. 
B. Protection of Individual Rights 
Not all information that contributes to SOCINT derives from 
communications metadata. Other information, such as that gleaned from social 
network sites, may be substantive.369 Telephony metadata, however, provides a 
good case study because some see it as an outlier—as not implicating the same 
privacy interests as content.370  
This argument is backed by Supreme Court doctrine dating back to the 
1970s, when landlines dominated communications.371 In Smith v. Maryland, the 
Court ruled that telephony data provided to third parties does not enjoy Fourth 
Amendment protections.372 
The problems with this argument are manifold. Most concerning, it fails to 
acknowledge that the entire point of collecting social intelligence is to map 
relationships and levels of intimacy between individuals. The Founders, rightly, 
evinced concern about giving the government insight into citizens’ private 
lives.373 
Part of the reason for their aversion relates to the harms detailed above.374 
That is, the information could be used to blackmail individuals opposed to the 
rulers’ social, political, or economic policies.375 Information could be used to 
discredit others—or criminal charges for unrelated offenses could be introduced 
to prevent opposition.376 The advent of SOCINT creates precisely the opportunity 
for such mischief. It was not the Founders’ sole concern. 
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Early Americans also worried about rights themselves.377 The walls of the 
home stood as a proxy for the right to privacy, the protection of which provided 
multiple benefits for self and society.378 The right to guard against unwelcome 
intrusion meant that a safe haven could be created, within which individuals 
could retreat from the outside world. 379  Solitude, and the need to protect 
individuals against intrusion from others, becomes ever more important in the 
digital age. It is important because it allows individuals to develop autonomy and 
ideas.  
By tracking social relationships, the government risks incursions into this 
private sphere. If individuals think they are being watched, their behavior 
changes.380 This impacts our ability to develop our ideas, and it hurts intimacy 
between individuals.381 Diversity in one’s relationships, however, is an essential 
part of human development. It also matters for the strength of the social fabric.382 
If people fear the government tracking them because they are in conversations 
with individuals from an ethnic or religious group considered suspect, then the 
ties between individuals in that group and those outside that group may 
significantly weaken. 383  So, too, may relationships among group members 
dissipate. What results is a much weaker social fabric with long-term 
consequences for humanistic interests of each person, much less the social ties 
themselves. It is not just the right to privacy that is hurt by SOCINT, but also 
associated rights such as the right to free association and the right to free speech. 
One may not communicate with others because of fear of government intrusion, 
thus harming one’s ability to articulate different beliefs, thoughts, and ideas. 
There is yet another aspect of the right itself that affects the nature of the 
state, and that is democratic deliberation.384 SOCINT makes it exceedingly easy 
to monitor political communities, which, as a result, may well alter their level of 
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engagement with political or economic concerns. Surveillance therefore may 
harm society’s ability to develop more robust policies, as well as stifle public 
debate about the strengths and weaknesses of the current regime. 
A final consideration relates to structure itself. The intelligence agencies 
represent just one portion of one branch of the federal government.385 This type 
of power, amassed in the hands of the few and ripe for abuse, has long term 
consequences for the distribution of power both among the federal branches of 
government as well as between the federal and state entities.386 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rapid technological and algorithmic advances have given rise to a new 
form of information: social intelligence. This tool, which centers on the 
collection of non-traditional forms of data about relationships, such as those 
offered by social media, communications data, and geolocational information, 
offers novel insights into the fabric of society. It provides a starting point for 
further socio-cultural knowledge generation. And it can be used to effect massive 
political, social, and economic change. As such, it qualitatively differs from other 
forms of intelligence. 
The current statutory regime proves ill-fitting for the type of information 
involved. The government’s attempted use of FISA to authorize telephony 
metadata collection fell far short of the statutory requirements. Nor did efforts to 
force Internet metadata into FISA’s pen register and trap and trace provisions 
fare better. In the meantime, Modern FISA is being stretched to incorporate a 
wide range of social intelligence about U.S. citizens, even as Executive Order 
12333 provides a broad framing for yet more collection of such sensitive 
information. 
One problem is that SOCINT can be used for not just ascertaining threats to 
the United States but also for heading off political opposition.387 Important nodes 
can be identified and neutralized, or pressured to act in certain ways. Social 
networks are also vulnerable to manipulation. They are dynamic processes and 
thus constantly changing and evolving. Information can be disseminated quickly 
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among the members of the network. Because they lack a territorial grounding, 
and instead are formed through the digital sphere, networks evolve with scant 
regard for political borders or regulatory structures. Communication, moreover, 
may occur instantaneously between lots of people, bringing massive human 
resources to bear. 
Another concern relates to the constitutional underpinning of the United 
States. The Fourth Amendment was created to protect against the broad 
collection of information on U.S. citizens because of the harms that could 
ensue.388 SOCINT is a powerful type of data. Had the British had access to it at 
the time of the Revolution, a very different outcome may have ensued. 389 
Whether one takes heart from this or despairs of it, the central point cannot be 
ignored: SOCINT carries with it an enormous amount of power. The rights basis 
also matters. The invasion of privacy may have deleterious consequences for 
values central to the United States.  
Together, these considerations suggest that more careful discussion of 
SOCINT takes place, before it fully evolves—not least because of the unique 
challenges it poses as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. Traditional FISA 
currently addresses electronic communications, physical search, pen register and 
trap and trace devices, and tangible goods. For the most part, SOCINT is now 
being collected under Modern FISA and Executive Order 12333. The time is ripe 
for Congress to extract these programs from the current framing and to amend 
FISA directly to take account of the promise—and perils—of social intelligence. 
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